The eFishery Scandal and its impact to Southeast Asia with Kristie Neo
Fresh out of the studio, Kristie Neo, an independent journalist covering tech and venture capital, joins us to dissect the rise of startup fraud in Southeast Asia and why it’s becoming more sophisticated. She shares her journey from broadcast journalism to investigative reporting, reflecting on the shift from high-growth hype to market corrections and corporate scandals. Kristie unpacks the eFishery scandal, explaining how founders manipulated financials and how investors got misled. She discusses why due diligence often fails, the role of unchecked valuations, and the impact of drying venture capital on the region’s startup ecosystem. Addressing investor confidence, Kristie explores what it will take to restore trust and accountability in Southeast Asia’s tech scene. Closing the conversation, she shares her vision for a more transparent startup ecosystem and what great looks like for the region’s next wave of entrepreneurs.
"So that was back in 2021. And then after Revolution Precrafted, there was Zilingo in 2022, and then Tanihub and Investree - which were P2P lenders in 2023(24) - and then eFishery. So actually every single year we've been getting pretty big blow ups. But as I was looking at the cases for each of them, one thing I've noticed is the sophistication of the fraud is actually becoming more advanced." - Kristie Neo
Profile: Kristie Neo, Independent Journalist (Linkedin) and the reference to her recent commentary: Thank you eFishery, Southeast Asia is officially off the kool-aid
Here is the edited transcript of our conversation:
Bernard Leong: Welcome to Analyse Asia, the premier podcast dedicated to dissecting the pulse of business technology and media in Asia. I'm Bernard Leong, and while the Southeast Asia ecosystem went from the boom to be off the kool aid, the cases of alleged and actual fraud cases in startups are exposed. What are the implications to the startup and venture capital ecosystem in Southeast Asia with me today, Kristie Neo, an independent journalist covering tech and venture capital in the emerging markets to help us break down these difficult issues. So Kristie, welcome to the show and I'm a fan of your recent article.
Kristie Neo: Thank you so much for having me, Bernard.
Bernard Leong: Let's start from your origin story and you have an illustrious career in media. So how do you start your career?
Kristie Neo:
My career actually started in Channel News Asia (CNA). I think those who live in Singapore or have spent time there would be more familiar with the channel. It is Singapore’s main broadcaster, covering Southeast Asia and the broader APAC (Asia Pacific) region. I started as a producer in current affairs, but later moved into business news, which was where I first gained exposure to finance and economics. Interestingly, I didn't have a background in business and finance, but once I transitioned, I fell in love with business reporting and decided to stay in the field.
One key takeaway from my time at CNA was the importance of telling stories from an Asian perspective. This is something I continue to advocate for—the role of local storytelling and journalism in shaping narratives. Fast forward to what I’m probably best known for: my time at DealStreetAsia (DSA). Before joining DSA, I did short stints at CNBC and We Are Social, along with some work in digital advertising. Then, in 2018, I joined DealStreetAsia, which is a Nikkei-owned publication.
That period—2018 to 2021—was the upswing of the private equity and venture capital (PEVC) ecosystem in Southeast Asia. By then, the region already had a few unicorns, with Grab and Gojek leading the pack. It was also the peak of the ride-hailing wars and the e-commerce boom, when SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son was pouring capital into the region, fueling rapid expansion.
Bernard Leong:
And now, Masayoshi Son is back, giving out money again!
Kristie Neo: Yeah, exactly. The cycle is coming back around. The unicorns became decacorns, and at that time, the big question was, Where are the major IPOs? Where are the exits? Then, around 2020 and 2021, we finally started seeing a few IPOs materialize. The ecosystem was growing, but after 2021, market corrections hit hard. The slowdown started in the U.S. private capital market and eventually trickled down to Southeast Asia. Covering both sides of the market was fascinating because, as you know, Southeast Asia’s ecosystem is still young—we hadn’t yet experienced a true market correction until now.
This downturn has completely changed the kinds of stories we tell. When I first started covering the region, everything was about fundraising and skyrocketing valuations. Now, the dominant narratives are down rounds, layoffs, consolidations, and corporate governance failures—like the eFishery, Tanihub, and Zilingo cases. I often hear from people who say, Kristie, we need more positive stories! But the reality is that most headlines today are about scandals, mismanagement, or cases of fraud—whether it’s funds misused, founders pocketing money, or inflated revenue numbers.
Bernard Leong: The one common line I actually agree with you on, and it was the same for me as well, is that we are trying to tell stories from the Asian perspective. Given your career journey across different media outlets, from large traditional organizations to startup-style platforms like DealStreetAsia and We Are Social, what key lessons can you share with my audience?
Kristie Neo: Well, my personal journey between larger and smaller media outlets has shown me that I actually prefer working in smaller teams. Even though I enjoyed my time at CNA, it was a hectic experience. CNA is a huge organization with a broad reach, but within that, the business news team was relatively small. There weren’t many journalists specifically interested in covering business, so I was fortunate to be part of a tight-knit, specialized team.
At DealStreetAsia, the team was also relatively small. The entire company had about 30 people, including the editorial staff and administrative support. If you removed the non-editorial staff, we were probably left with around 20 journalists. In a smaller setup, everyone is more hands-on. You have to roll up your sleeves, hustle, and take on a variety of responsibilities. I enjoy that level of involvement and flexibility, which is something I found missing in larger institutions.
I also had a short stint at CNBC, but it wasn’t the right cultural fit for me. At that time, I assumed that working for a major American media brand would offer a bigger platform and a wider reach. In some ways, it did. The brand recognition, credibility, and halo effect of working at places like Bloomberg, Reuters, or CNBC are undeniable. However, with that came layers of bureaucracy—not just on the administrative side but also in editorial decision-making. I felt that there was less room for flexibility in covering stories that I found truly interesting.
Ultimately, a lot of this comes down to leadership and editorial direction. Larger organizations tend to follow a specific formula for what works, while smaller teams often have more freedom to experiment. When I joined DealStreetAsia, the publication was about four or five years old. It was an up-and-coming media outlet—well-known in niche circles but not widely recognized across the industry.
Back then, we were often left out of major industry events and media launches. I remember being frustrated when the big reports from organizations like Temasek and Google-Temasek would go out to mainstream media, but we wouldn’t receive access. I would wonder, why does Tech in Asia get an invite? Why does Bloomberg get early access, but we don’t? That frustration drove us to push harder, build our reputation, and make sure that people in the industry recognized our work.
Not everyone enjoys that kind of struggle, but I do. I like working hard, and I find it rewarding. After six years at DealStreetAsia, the publication had earned its place in the industry. By then, people took us seriously, and we had established a strong reputation and brand value. That journey—from being overlooked to becoming a recognized name in business journalism—was incredibly fulfilling.
Bernard Leong: That’s a great reflection, and it’s very similar to my own journey with Analyse Asia over the last decade. For example, I was only able to secure my first interview on the Google-Temasek report after their sixth year of releasing it.
Kristie Neo: Nice.
Bernard Leong:
After some time, last year, I finally got to interview representatives from Google, Temasek, and Bain on the eConomy SEA report 2024 together in the studio. It was a culmination of years of effort in building a media outlet and establishing a reputation. I completely relate to your experience because I went through a similar journey with SGE (SGEntrepreneurs), which was eventually acquired by Tech in Asia [that was in turned acquired by SPH], and now with Analyse Asia.
Now, let’s get into the main topic of the day. Is the Southeast Asia startup boom officially over? That was my immediate reaction after reading your article. For my audience, I will include a link to your piece on LinkedIn—Thank You, eFishery. Southeast Asia is Officially Off the Kool-Aid. As someone who has closely followed the Southeast Asia startup and venture capital ecosystem, your insights are invaluable, particularly in relation to scandals like the eFishery case.
Let's start with that story. Can you walk us through the eFishery scandal? Before that, we’ve also seen cases like Tanihub and allegations surrounding Zilingo. Can you give a brief chronological overview of eFishery, the early warning signs, and how the story unfolded? If I remember correctly, the news first broke in DealStreetAsia when the board suspended both founders of the company.
Kristie Neo: That’s right. From what I understand, DealStreetAsia started reporting on it towards the end of last year. Just to clarify, I wasn’t the one who wrote the investigative piece, though after I published my op-ed, many people assumed I was directly involved in breaking the story. DSA did a great job uncovering the details.
The first signs of trouble emerged towards the end of last year, but to be honest, I had already been hearing industry murmurs even earlier—while I was still at DealStreetAsia. Investors were making cryptic remarks, saying things like, "If eFishery collapses, it’s going to be a big deal." At the time, those comments seemed speculative, but looking back, they were early indicators that something wasn’t right.
For those unfamiliar with the Southeast Asian startup ecosystem, eFishery wasn’t just another startup. It was a unicorn with a strong roster of institutional investors on its cap table, including IFC, SoftBank Vision Fund, Abu Dhabi’s G42 Fund, and Temasek.
Bernard Leong: Temasek, our local (Singapore) sovereign wealth fund.
Kristie Neo: Yes, exactly. Along with major venture capital firms like Northstar, which started as a private equity firm before moving into venture capital. From what I understand, they and several other local VCs took a significant hit from eFishery.
With such a strong lineup of investors, eFishery was considered one of Indonesia’s most promising unicorns. When news of financial irregularities surfaced, it wasn’t just bad for the company—it was damaging for the entire investment ecosystem.
Bernard Leong: They raised hundreds of millions of dollars, hitting a billion-dollar valuation in their last round.
Kristie Neo: That’s right. eFishery started as a fish feed company, initially developing an automated fish feeder to help fish and shrimp farmers optimize feeding processes. The idea was that by controlling the amount of feed dispensed, farmers could reduce waste, cut costs, and improve efficiency.
The business model was built on improving transparency and efficiency in aquaculture, an industry that is highly informal and fragmented. The goal was to increase farm productivity while raising farmer incomes, which aligned well with the impact and ESG investing trends that were gaining traction at the time.
But that’s also where the risks emerged. Many Southeast Asian startups that have received VC funding in recent years have been tech-enabled businesses trying to digitize highly traditional sectors—whether in agriculture, aquaculture, or fintech. These industries have opaque data systems, making it difficult for investors to track performance accurately.
And that’s the problem. How do you verify how much fish feed is being used? How do you accurately track yield improvements? Unless you’re literally counting every fish or weighing every bucket of feed, conducting due diligence on such businesses is incredibly complex. Investors were essentially operating on trust, which, as we now see, proved to be a major vulnerability.
Bernard Leong: Let’s take a step back and look at what actually happened. What were the specific actions that the eFishery founders took to inflate their revenue figures? If you think about it, most businesses don’t start with the intention to defraud customers or investors.
At the beginning, I’d assume there was a legitimate business model. But at what point did they cross the line? When did they start manipulating the numbers? And ultimately, what led to them getting caught?
Kristie Neo: It all unraveled when a whistleblower report surfaced. Over the past year, this report was sent not only to the media but also to investors. That triggered an internal investigation, which was conducted by an external agency to dig deeper into what was really happening. The findings were shocking. One of the key tactics they used was round-tripping funds. Essentially, they created multiple nominee entities—five of them, from what I understand—and routed funds across these entities to fabricate transactions. This is actually a common scheme in fintech fraud. You artificially create transactions and cycle funds through different accounts to make it appear as if revenue is growing. Investors see the transaction volume and assume it reflects genuine market demand.
Beyond that, they kept two separate sets of financial books. One was for internal leadership, and the other was for external parties like shareholders, banks, and auditors. In these fraudulent reports, they significantly inflated their revenue. They had been manipulating their financials since 2018, which is particularly alarming because that was the year they were raising their Series A funding.
To put things into perspective, their actual revenue versus the revenue they reported had a 4.8x discrepancy. On top of that, they also forged invoices, contracts, and other financial documents to back up their false revenue claims.
The deception was incredibly sophisticated and meticulously planned. This wasn’t a one-time case of fraud—it was a long-term, carefully orchestrated scheme.
Bernard Leong: That makes me wonder about the due diligence process. How did this go unnoticed for so long?
Kristie Neo: That’s a great question. One thing I often ask investors is, How do you conduct due diligence on a founder’s character?
When someone starts a company, they typically do so with good intentions. They’re passionate about an idea, they’re sacrificing a stable job, and in many cases, they have families relying on them. At that point, they’re focused on building something real. But how do you predict how success will change a person? What happens when they suddenly control millions of dollars, when they’re constantly in the press, being hailed as the next great entrepreneur? At what point does the drive for growth turn into pressure to fabricate numbers to meet investor expectations?
There’s no definitive way to measure this. It’s part of the inherent risk of investing in startups. In the case of eFishery, shareholders were completely misled for years. If the whistleblower hadn’t come forward, who knows how long it would have continued? Maybe some investors had suspicions, but nothing substantial enough to take action.
Bernard Leong: So something clearly broke down in the due diligence process. We don’t know exactly what, but it’s worth examining.
What made the eFishery story so compelling to investors in the first place? How did that contribute to the extent of the fraud?
From the outside, it appears that this fraud was highly sophisticated and dates back to 2018. That was during the funding boom, when investors were aggressively looking for opportunities. The founders seem to have strategically positioned the company to appeal to that momentum, continuously fabricating numbers to maintain investor confidence. Then, eventually, someone blew the whistle.
From the perspective of an investor, how did they get sold on the vision so easily? Why was this such an attractive deal initially, only for it to unravel later?
Kristie Neo:
It checked a lot of the right boxes for investors. One of the factors I didn’t include in my article—but I do think played a role—was the emphasis on ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) investing at the time.
Around the time eFishery raised its unicorn round, impact investing was a major trend. Investors were actively looking for businesses that not only digitized traditional industries but also contributed to broader social good—like raising farmer incomes or improving efficiency in agriculture and aquaculture.
Beyond that, eFishery wasn’t just an agriculture-tech company. It also had fintech elements, providing financing and digital tools to its ecosystem. That made it even more attractive to investors looking for scalable, tech-enabled businesses.
Many venture capital firms were under pressure to meet ESG mandates set by their limited partners (LPs). This was particularly true for institutional investors from Europe and the U.S., where ESG accountability is a priority. These firms needed to allocate funds to businesses that aligned with DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) or ESG principles.
At the time, growth-stage investments in Southeast Asia were scarce, especially for companies that seemed profitable or close to profitability. So eFishery ticked all the right boxes:
- High Growth-stage startup
- Tech-enabled agriculture business
- Positive ESG impact
- Strong institutional investor backing
- Promised profitability
That’s why investors bought into the story. But it also raises a bigger question—was due diligence just a box-ticking exercise? Because if investors were genuinely scrutinizing the numbers, how did they miss such a massive discrepancy?
Look, I’m not an investor, so I can’t say exactly how they conduct their due diligence. But this case certainly suggests that some of it was surface-level validation rather than deep financial analysis.
Bernard Leong:
Maybe we should take a step back. First, there was Tanihub in Indonesia, then the alleged fraud involving Zilingo. Now, with funding drying up over the last two to three years, what do you think is the broader impact on the startup and VC ecosystem in Southeast Asia?
Are we heading back to the dark ages of 2009 or 2014? That era where startup funding was incredibly scarce?
Kristie Neo: It's clearly not a good look. While preparing for our conversation today, I took a moment to reflect on some of the major startup scandals that have surfaced over the years. I wanted to identify trends and see if there were any similarities or differences between them.
One of the first big fraud cases I worked on at DealStreetAsia was Revolution Precrafted in the Philippines.
Bernard Leong: Yes, I remember that story.
Kristie Neo: That was back in 2021. After that came Zilingo in 2022, then Tanihub and Investree—both peer-to-peer (P2P) lenders—in 2023 and 2024, followed by eFishery.
Every single year, there has been at least one major blow-up. But what stood out to me the most was how the level of sophistication in these fraud cases keeps increasing.
Let’s take Revolution Precrafted as an example. It was a Philippine-based company that was supposed to build luxury prefab homes for low-income families. The issue wasn’t exactly embezzlement, but rather an obsession with vanity metrics—especially the unicorn title, which was a big deal back then because Southeast Asia had so few unicorns.
The founder was trying to raise only $1–3 million, yet he claimed the company had a $1.8 billion valuation. That simply didn’t add up. Eventually, when we went to Manila to investigate, we found that the company wasn’t even building any of these homes.
So while he wasn’t necessarily stealing money, he was inflating the company’s valuation to chase the billion-dollar label. But what was the actual size of the business? Tiny. It was all smoke and mirrors.
Bernard Leong: Maybe he just wanted to prove a point?
Kristie Neo: Exactly. Back then, there were quite a few shady characters playing this game. Then you look at Zilingo, and its fraud was more about revenue recognition. This is a problem we see frequently. When I say revenue recognition, I mean things like GMV (gross merchandise value) versus GTV (gross transaction value) — which one should be used? Should they report gross revenue or net revenue? Should they present adjusted EBITDA or traditional EBITDA? These nuances in financial reporting can completely change how a company’s valuation is perceived.
Bernard Leong: I’ve always found adjusted revenue to be a terrible idea. Too many startup founders start believing their own hype. They create “adjusted EBITDA” to rationalize why they still deserve unicorn status—even when their unit economics clearly don’t work. The reality is, if your business fundamentals don’t hold up, you should just shut down the company and move on.
Kristie Neo: Exactly, but instead, many founders—and sometimes even investors—get caught up in this illusion of success, convincing themselves that a few tweaks in financial reporting will buy them more time. The problem is, eventually, the truth comes out.
Bernard Leong: Yeah, that’s the feeling I’m getting with all these created metrics you mentioned. Take the Zilingo case, for example.
Kristie Neo: Exactly. I think that’s what happened with Zilingo. By the time that story broke, a lot of investors were already in the process of reassessing their portfolios. They were trying to identify the strong performers, the struggling ones, and the companies that needed to be shut down immediately. Revenue recognition issues aren’t unique to Zilingo—many companies deal with them. But the way the story unraveled and how it was publicized made it stand out.
Bernard Leong:
That’s an interesting perspective. It’s something people don’t talk about enough—how these fraud cases are becoming increasingly sophisticated. The next one could be even bigger, but we won’t know until it happens. One issue I keep hearing about is the role of international VCs investing in Southeast Asia startups. I’ve had conversations with people—some of them VCs themselves—who tell me that associates sometimes raise red flags, but the partners push ahead with deals anyway.
It’s often an ego-driven move. The logic is: Everyone else is in on this deal, so we have to be in it too. I won’t name names, but I’ve seen this happen.
Then there’s the check-the-box mentality. I don’t think many VCs genuinely assess a founder’s character. If you listen to US venture capital podcasts, you often hear investors saying they take founders on long walks to understand their background, motivations, and values. But in reality, I don’t see that happening much.
Instead, they focus on surface-level credentials—whether the founder went to a prestigious school, for example. We’ve seen cases where people fabricated their backgrounds, like the founder of that 3D construction company in Singapore [Jon Lee from Vizzio], or the Indonesian founders (of Octopus) who falsely claimed to be from Berkeley.
When it comes to due diligence, the process is supposed to uncover red flags. But sometimes, it feels like investors don’t actually care—maybe because of the power law logic that dominates VC thinking.
Kristie Neo: I wouldn’t say they don’t care at all—that might be a stretch. After all, these investors are putting real money into these startups. As an investor, you have to trust your founders to some extent. You can’t micromanage every little thing they do like helicopter parenting.
Bernard Leong: I’m not talking about helicopter parenting. I mean they don’t even bother to understand the founder’s real motivations. When companies emphasize culture, they often filter for certain character traits. But in the startup world, that doesn’t seem to be a priority.
Kristie Neo: I get what you mean. Honestly, it’s difficult to tell how someone will change over time.
In the beginning, when a founder has very little, they’re driven by ambition and a belief in their vision. But what happens when that same founder is suddenly managing millions of dollars?
A few million dollars is life-changing money for many people in Southeast Asia. It may not seem like much in places like Singapore, but for a lot of founders in the region, it’s the most money they’ve ever handled. And you just don’t know how they will react to that kind of wealth and power.
This isn’t just about founders. There are investors who fall into this trap too. Some of them love media attention—doing TV interviews, speaking at conferences. It becomes less about making great investments and more about how much visibility they have.
Suddenly, being a VC isn’t about finding great companies or delivering returns to LPs—it becomes a narcissistic pursuit of status and recognition.
And let’s not forget, this is private capital we’re talking about. That means less transparency and more room for questionable practices. The structure of deals, the people involved, the metrics they use—everything is opaque. That’s why when the media investigates these cases, it shakes up the industry.
When these fraud stories break, they remind investors that someone is watching. That they can’t just operate unchecked. But of course, no one likes bad news—it’s a bitter pill to swallow.
Bernard Leong: So what does this mean for the Southeast Asian startup ecosystem going forward? Are we in trouble?
Kristie Neo: We’re definitely not in a great place right now.
Capital has been drying up for years, and it’s only getting worse. If you look at recent reports, the number of deals being made has dropped significantly. Even VC fundraising has slowed for over a year now.
And these scandals? They’re not helping. Some of them have involved LPs (limited partners) directly, which makes it even worse.
Think about institutional investors like IFC and G42—some of them have gotten burned in Southeast Asia. For some LPs, these were their first deals in the region. The GPs (general partners) spent years convincing these investors that Southeast Asia was a great alternative to China and India—that it was an emerging powerhouse with high potential.
That’s literally been the narrative for the last three years. But when institutional investors see scandals in the headlines, why would they take another risk on Southeast Asia?
That’s one of the biggest concerns I keep hearing from investors lately. And honestly, it’s a very legitimate concern.
Bernard Leong: It doesn’t help when Southeast Asia is compared to markets like India, where the economy has grown 16.5 times, or Latin America, where companies like Nubank have gone public in the U.S. and become major success stories. To be fair, Southeast Asia does have some strong players. SEA Group has held up relatively well, and companies like Grab and Gojek remain dominant in their respective markets.
But the big question is exits. We’re not seeing a lot of them happening. From your perspective, do you think that the lack of exits combined with the rise in fraud cases will deter future investment in the region?
Kristie Neo: Yeah, I think it definitely will. One of the things that needs to happen—and I’m curious to see if eFishery investors will pursue this—is some form of legal action against those responsible for fraud. Take Tanihub and Investree, for example. The founders suspected of fraud and bribery have disappeared, and no one knows where they are. The same thing seems to be happening with eFishery—no one knows where the founders are.
If investors don’t pursue legal accountability, it sets a dangerous precedent. This isn’t just about millions of dollars lost—it’s about the reputation of the entire ecosystem. If fraudsters aren’t penalized, it sends the message that you can commit financial crimes and face no consequences.
That would create a trust issue not just among founders, but across the entire investment ecosystem. If the legal system isn’t strong enough to handle these cases, how can investors feel confident putting more money into Southeast Asia?
I don’t know if the investors in eFishery will actually take action, but how they handle this case will send a strong signal—not just to startups and investors in Southeast Asia, but to the global investment community.
If these fraud cases go unpunished, how can we expect new investors to trust this market?
Bernard Leong: Legal accountability is a critical factor. From an investor’s perspective, we do our best to assess founders and their businesses before making investments. Angel investors, for instance, rarely make a lot of money. What they gain is goodwill and the ability to help early-stage companies grow.
But once these startups reach a certain size, raising capital gets much harder.
A few years ago, there was too much capital in the market—especially between 2018 and 2021. Now, we’re in a period where capital is drying up. What do you think this shift means for the market dynamics going forward?
Kristie Neo: When you say it gets harder to raise capital as companies grow, which stage are you referring to?
Bernard Leong: It used to be that Series A was the bottleneck. But between 2018 and 2022, raising Series A or even Series B wasn’t that difficult.
The real challenge started at Series C—that’s where companies struggled to raise capital. And when you look at growth-stage funds, they’re rarely deploying in Southeast Asia.
Now, the problem at Series C is starting to percolate down to Series A and B. Companies looking for growth capital are finding it much harder to raise funding compared to just a few years ago.
Between 2018 and 2021, Series A rounds were much more common. Before the Grab era, even raising pre-seed to Series A was extremely difficult. But during the funding boom, there was too much capital chasing too few good deals.
Kristie Neo: So you’re saying the slowdown is spreading downward, affecting Series A and B as well?
Bernard Leong: Exactly. The entire fundraising spectrum is slowing down.
Another issue no one talks about is VC fund DPI (Distributions to Paid-In Capital). Many funds that started in 2014 are reaching their 10-year cycle, which means LPs will soon start demanding returns.
Kristie Neo: Yeah, we don’t talk about it much, but it’s going to happen. At some point, someone will break the news on it.
Bernard Leong: I’m already seeing secondary LPs trying to buy stakes at a discount.
Kristie Neo: I’ve been asking around about secondary market activity for the last two years. Normally, during a slowdown, you’d expect secondary deals to pick up—but that hasn’t really happened in Southeast Asia.
Bernard Leong: That’s because valuations haven’t been marked down yet.
Kristie Neo: Exactly. And from what I’ve heard, the main issue isn’t buyers—it’s sellers. Many Asian investors are refusing to negotiate on price, which means the bid-ask gap remains too wide.
In the U.S., the secondary market has already corrected itself over the last two years. But in Asia-Pacific and other emerging markets, valuations haven’t been adjusted enough to allow for meaningful secondary activity.
Bernard Leong: A lot of it comes down to market opacity. These are private companies, so it’s harder to get a clear picture of what’s really happening.
Kristie Neo: It also speaks to the quality of businesses. If there were more profitable, revenue-generating startups, we wouldn’t be seeing this kind of secondary market stagnation. But right now, we’re not seeing much M&A activity either.
Bernard Leong: Which brings us back to what I said earlier—adjusted EBITDA is a terrible metric. Some companies are growing quickly, but losing 50 cents on every dollar they make. That’s not a sustainable business model.
Kristie Neo: They assume they’ll eventually grow into profitability, but it doesn’t always happen.
Bernard Leong: That’s a mistake many founders make. One of the things I did in the past was help zombie startups exit. These were companies that had stopped growing, weren’t making revenue, and had founders who now had families to support.
Kristie Neo: That must have been a tough process.
Bernard Leong: It was very personal for me as I spent my time to help these founders. I was a failed startup founder myself, and it was very public.
Ten years ago, I started a high-growth company, but we couldn’t raise a Series A. Instead of faking the numbers, we decided to shut down.
We had a shutdown party, and even the Tech in Asia team was there to cover it. We were honest—we admitted the business model didn’t work. It was painful, but we knew it was better to fail properly than to resort to fraud.
Kristie Neo: That must have been a really difficult decision to make.
Bernard Leong: It was. But it taught me a valuable lesson. A lot of founders start with good intentions. But when they hit a crunch point, they have to ask themselves: Do I keep pushing forward with something that isn’t working? Or do I shut it down and move on? The VC model is designed for power law outcomes, but maybe Southeast Asia isn’t ready for that yet. Maybe achieving 10x instead of 100x returns is more realistic for this region.
Kristie Neo: That’s the real question. How many startups here can actually achieve those kinds of returns?
Bernard Leong: I don’t know. But let me ask you two final questions.
First, what’s one question about Southeast Asia that you wish people would ask you more often—but they don’t?
Kristie Neo: That’s an interesting one. I relocated to Dubai last year, and since then, I’ve interacted with a lot of people from the Middle East. One thing I’ve noticed is that Singapore has an incredibly strong global brand.
People in the Middle East view Singapore as a model—not just in terms of governance but also in trust, rule of law, and anti-corruption measures.
The perception of Singapore as a serious, no-nonsense place has been reinforced by soft power initiatives, including things like Crazy Rich Asians.
It’s something I think Singaporeans tend to undervalue, but it’s a real competitive advantage.
Bernard Leong: I just wish we had a bigger population because our market is simply too small. It’s not about putting ourselves down—it’s just the reality. Our systems are incredibly well-developed, probably on par with what the U.S. has, but the market size is a constraint. Meanwhile, surrounding markets are much larger, yet they struggle with maintaining rule of law, which is why we are seeing so much fraud now.
Kristie Neo: That’s absolutely true.
Bernard Leong: My final question—what does great look like for Southeast Asia to live up to its expectations?
Kristie Neo: For Southeast Asia to reach its full potential, I hope we continue to build big, ambitious, and bold businesses. I know we’re not in the best part of the cycle right now, but I hope this isn’t the end. I don’t want to say it’s over—it sounds too final.
Bernard Leong: Things change. We’ve all thought it was the end before, but the cycle always shifts.
Kristie Neo: Exactly. I still believe there’s strong talent in the region, especially in Singapore. We have all the key ingredients to build something great.
But one issue I see—both with founders and investors—is risk aversion. It’s something even ecosystem players acknowledge. We have everything needed to succeed, yet the system doesn’t always reward risk-taking. And if you don’t take risks, you will never achieve outlier outcomes.
Bernard Leong: Many thanks for coming on the show. Just before we wrap up, any recommendations that have inspired you recently?
Kristie Neo: Are you asking about books or movies? I’ve been reading more about the Middle East since moving there. Right now, I’m reading The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine by Rashid Khalidi. I’ve also been reading Main Street Millionaire by Codie Sanchez, which focuses on how to acquire small businesses.
Bernard Leong:
Where can people find you?
Kristie Neo:
Oh, you mean where people can reach me? The best way is LinkedIn—just drop me a message there.
Bernard Leong:
You can find Analyse Asia on YouTube, Spotify, and all the major platforms.
Many thanks for coming on the show, and I look forward to speaking with you again. Take care & stay safe.
Kristie Neo:
Thank you.
Podcast Information: Bernard Leong (@bernardleong, Linkedin) hosts and produces the show. Proper credits for the intro and end music: "Energetic Sports Drive" and the episode is mixed & edited in both video and audio format by G. Thomas Craig (@gthomascraig, LinkedIn). Here are the links to watch or listen to our podcast.
